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Article 2

FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF
MARGARET A. BERGER

Introduction
Edward K. Cheng†
It is my privilege to introduce this special issue of the
Brooklyn Law Review in honor of my colleague and mentor,
Margaret A. Berger. When Margaret announced her retirement
from almost forty years of teaching at Brooklyn Law School,
many of us were at a loss as to what to do. Naturally, as local
tradition dictates, there would be a retirement dinner,
complete with toasts from colleagues and family, speeches by
former students, and the unveiling of a portrait. But for
Margaret, the occasion seemed to demand something extra,
something to acknowledge her remarkable contributions to the
law of evidence and her eminent place in the field.
Out of that vaguely unsettled feeling, Larry Solan and I,
in consultation with our dean, Joan Wexler, arrived at a
“festschrift.” Using foreign phrases of course has its dangers,
and throughout this process the Berger “Festschrift” has not
infrequently been greeted with puzzled looks and tentative
pronunciations. In concept though, everyone has perfectly
understood not only what it is, but also why it is a perfect fit
for Margaret’s retirement. A new collection of works on the law
of evidence looking not only at the past, but also to the future—
what better way to celebrate Margaret’s career?
Margaret’s career in the law of evidence has spanned
the full breadth of the discipline. As a scholar, she has coauthored (with Judge Jack Weinstein) arguably the preeminent
†

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I want to thank all of the
festschrift participants for their time and effort in making this celebration possible;
Andrei Takhteyev, Joe Roy, and the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for their
tireless efforts in editing this issue; and Larry Solan and Joan Wexler for their support.

1057

1058

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as written a
number of influential law review articles. As a teacher, she has
co-authored a leading evidence casebook, enlightened
generations of students, and educated judges about the
complexities of science with her now-famous Science for Judges
conferences. As a lawyer, she has written amicus briefs to the
Supreme Court and served on pathbreaking committees of the
National Academy of Sciences. And as a member of the
academic community, Margaret has embraced her role as part
of the vanguard for women in the legal academy, and she has
served as an important role model for young scholars female
and male alike.
Befitting a career of such incredible scope, sixteen
evidence scholars make their contributions in this festschrift
issue. The word “festschrift” comes from the German, which
can be literally translated as “party writing” or “festival
writing” and this festschrift lives up to that name. As with
most parties (good ones, at least), the sounds emanating from
this festschrift are celebratory, boisterous, and more
importantly, polyphonous. The articles run the gamut of
modern evidence law.
The festschrift begins with three tributes. Judge Jack
Weinstein is a natural tribute writer for any evidence scholar,
but his tribute is a particularly fitting one in this case. After
all, Margaret was not only Judge Weinstein’s first law clerk,
but she has collaborated with him for years on both their
treatise and casebook. Eleanor Swift writes a moving tribute to
Margaret’s impact on women teaching in the field of evidence,
and Larry Solan writes one as her long time colleague at
Brooklyn Law School.
As might be expected given Margaret’s scholarly focus
over the last two decades, scientific evidence articles comprise
the lion’s share of this issue. Jennifer Mnookin, who delivered
the Ira M. Belfer Lecture that preceded Margaret’s retirement
dinner, considers the problems facing the forensic identification
sciences. She devotes considerable effort addressing a key
question left largely unexplored by the recent National
Academy of Sciences report—how should courts respond to the
problems found in forensic science?
The forensic themes of the Mnookin lecture surface in
other contributions. Paul Giannelli, for example, chronicles
Margaret’s involvement in the three biggest events in the
recent history of forensic science—the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the
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acceptance of DNA evidence in the courtroom, and the recent
National Academy of Sciences report. Ed Imwinkelried
continues this vein by exploring Margaret’s role as amicus
curiae in both Daubert and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.
A different variation on the forensic theme appears in
David Kaye’s contribution, which responds to a recent article
by Jay Koehler and Michael Saks on the “individualization
fallacy” in the forensic sciences. Kaye contends that they
overstate their claim. Koehler and Saks in turn write a
contribution in response.
In other scientific evidence pieces, an interesting thread
emerges among several articles that highlights the tension
between the general nature of science and the particularized
nature of legal inquiry. As David Faigman notes in his
contribution, this “evidentiary incommensurability” lies at the
root of the tension between science and law, and he provides a
useful taxonomy for navigating the terrain. Joe Sanders takes
this dichotomy in a different direction, using it to explain the
longstanding conundrum of why courts seemingly apply
Daubert more strictly in civil cases than in criminal ones. I also
rely heavily on the distinction in my contribution, which argues
that scientific facts should be treated not like ordinary
adjudicative facts but rather like foreign law.
Beyond scientific evidence, other evidentiary concerns
and doctrines make appearances as well. Michael Risinger goes
back to basics, arguing that reform of the evidentiary rules
should strive to improve accuracy, as determined through a
combination of empirical evidence and common sense. In
contrast, Aviva Orenstein tackles a specific evidentiary bête
noire, advocating that the rule governing past convictions for
crimes of deceit under Rule 609(b) should be subject to a
judicial balancing test like Rule 403.
Three contributions comment on the Confrontation
Clause, motivated in part by Margaret’s pre-Crawford work on
confrontation issues: her 1992 article discussing the
Confrontation Clause implications of statements solicited by
government actors, and her amicus briefs in Idaho v. Wright
and Lilly v. Virginia. Bob Mosteller argues that informant
testimony should be recorded in “draft form” to reveal the
potential influence of government agents. Norman Abrams
writes about the implications of Davis v. Washington’s “ongoing
emergency” qualification to the Confrontation Clause for
terrorism prosecutions and government attempts to gain
information for intelligence purposes. Myrna Raeder discusses
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the future of forfeiture doctrine in domestic violence cases in
the wake of Giles v. California.
Finally, no festschrift in honor of Margaret could be
complete without some words about teaching, and Roger Park
kindly obliges with his reflections on “clickers.” With its often
technical yet deterministic rules as well as its link to real-time
courtroom objections, Evidence may be the most amenable
among law school survey courses to the “clicker” revolution.
Park offers one example of how to inject “clicker” technology
into the classroom successfully.
* * *
So this festschrift is polyphonous indeed. And although
detractors sometimes characterize the field of evidence as a
narrow set of arcane rules—perhaps even a narrow set of
irrelevant rules given the death of the trial—this celebration
shows the field to be vibrant and wide-ranging. This result
should come as no surprise. After all, the process of proof and
the rules that govern it are not only fundamental to legal
inquiry, but also necessarily reflect our deepest values.
A final word of thanks. Although the footnote at the
beginning of this introduction acknowledges all of the people
who made this festschrift possible, I purposely made one
glaring omission, saving the best for last. I think it safe to say
that all of the participants, as well as everyone else in the field
of evidence, would gladly join me in thanking Margaret for
dedicating her career to our field and helping make it what it is
today. It is our great fortune to have her as a colleague and
friend, and we look forward to her new contributions for many
years to come.

TRIBUTES TO PROFESSOR
MARGARET A. BERGER

Tribute
The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein†
How fortunate are those of us whose lives have been
enriched by Margaret Berger.
A superb classroom teacher of civil procedure, evidence,
mass torts, and science and the law, she has provided the basis
for professional success, a life of the intellect, and the ethical
practice of law for thousands of her students.
For hundreds of state and federal judges, scientists, and
government administrators of science-based programs, she has
presented an extraordinary series of seminars and working
sessions that have measurably improved the capacity of lawyers,
scientists, and government officials to administer the law.
Colleagues in teaching and practicing lawyers and
judges have been grateful for her influential casebooks,
treatises, and articles.
To her many friends, she epitomizes the supportive,
enchanting, engaged personal relationships that add sweetness
to life even in its most trying hours.
And there is yet another dimension that is at the core of
this uncommon woman. It is glimpsed from time to time by
those who have had the pleasure of visiting her home. There she
presides with warm elegance in her beautifully old-world
furnished apartment in midtown Manhattan and her suburban
house by the sea. Margaret, along with Mark, her late husband,
a well known general practitioner, and their sons, Josh, a T.V.
stage manager, and David, a boutique firm litigator, have often
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Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York.
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invited students, colleagues, and friends to share their beautiful
and bountiful table and cultured conversation.
It has been my privilege and honor to know Margaret
Berger. She was my student (and thus my teacher) and my first
law clerk. We have been coauthors and joint instructors. She
has been a dear friend for over half a century. My bias in her
favor is no disqualification from participating in this well
deserved Berger Festschrift and dinner in her honor. As
demonstrated by this outpouring of affection and by the many
tributes to her and her Science for Judges programs in the
sixteenth volume of the Journal of Law and Policy, legions will
confirm that here partiality is mandated by truth.

Tribute
Lawrence M. Solan†
Margaret Berger and I have been colleagues at Brooklyn
Law School since I joined the faculty in 1996. In the beginning,
I really didn’t know what to make of her. Some people are best
described as “no-nonsense,” others as “warm and friendly,” still
others as “brutally honest.” Margaret is all of those things
among others, and sees no conflict among them. She is a
complex and brilliant woman. I learned this about her fairly
quickly, and we soon became close friends.
I know Margaret’s work well, and have even been
fortunate enough to have written with her, which I hope to do
again. Her work reveals a tightly argued, yet compassionate
vision of the law. To take one example: Legal scholars have
been concerned about the fact that there is not enough science
in what passes as scientific evidence. Margaret has been part of
this movement. But at the same time, Margaret has forged
another, contrarian movement, whose theme is that the fetish
of unattainable scientific certainty is being used by the courts
to ensure that those injured by chemical and pharmaceutical
products cannot recover for their injuries. That is because the
courts require scientific proof of causation that is stricter than
the scientific community can generally provide.
Margaret proposes changes in the substantive law, as
well as the law of evidence and procedure, the latter two of
which she regards as parts of the same package. She not only
sees the big picture, but she is willing to paint a new one if that
is what is needed.
For those who know how deeply Margaret has devoted
herself to music, opera, and theater (for most of her life with
her late husband, Mark), it should not be surprising that her
work is as humanistic as it is intellectually crisp. I can’t say
with scientific certainty that Margaret Berger is one of a kind,
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Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Don Forchelli Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School.
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but I’ve been attempting to falsify that hypothesis for some
time, and have come up empty so far.

Tribute
Eleanor Swift†
For women teaching in the field of evidence law,
Professor Margaret Berger’s career shines as a beacon—a
stellar teacher, a highly-respected scholar of scientific
evidentiary issues, co-author of the most venerated of evidence
casebooks, co-author of the foundational treatise on the Federal
Rules of Evidence, consultant to courts, private and
government commissions too numerous to mention, and
Reporter to (among other august institutions) the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. She has broken
every glass ceiling in academia.
It could not have always been easy. Margaret entered
the legal profession at a time when women were not hired by
major New York law firms. She entered law teaching just as
women were becoming a significant presence in law school
student bodies, but not yet in law school faculties. And in the
field of evidence law, male professors were iconic figures. Yet I
wonder whether Margaret would ever admit how hard it was.
She would probably give her characteristic “shrug” to
underplay her own remarkable achievements.
These achievements paved the way for women who
followed her into the academic profession and into the field of
evidence law. It is easier not to be the first, even though
Margaret always set such a high standard. Even her
introductions are masterpieces, as those who heard her
remarks about Judge Weinstein at the AALS Evidence Section
Luncheon in 2008 well remember. And she paved the way with
her own brand of fellowship as well as her own achievements.
At every major Evidence conference, at which she was always
an invited speaker, Margaret welcomed us. She shared her
inquiring mind with us, immediately treating us as colleagues
instead of newcomers.
It is her combination of fellowship and accomplishment
that I have admired from near and afar for more than twenty
†

Professor of Law, University of California, School of Law.
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years. I know this admiration is shared by countless other
women (and men too) who have been similarly inspired by
Professor Margaret Berger.

